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Abstract
The regulation of health and environmental risks has generated transatlantic controversy concerning precaution and the precautionary principle (PP). Conventional wisdom
sees the European Union endorsing the PP and proactively regulating uncertain risks,
while the United States opposes the PP and waits for evidence of harm before regulating. Without favouring either approach, this paper critically analyses the conventional
depiction of transatlantic divergence. First, it reviews several different versions of the
PP and their different implications. Second, it broadens the transatlantic comparison
of precaution beyond the typical focus on single-risk examples, such as genetically modied foods. Through case studies, including hormones in beef and milk production and
mad cow disease in beef and in blood donations, as well as reference to a wider array
of risks, the paper demonstrates that relative precaution varies enormously. Sometimes
the EU is more precautionary than the US (such as regarding hormones in beef), while
sometimes the US is more precautionary than the EU (such as regarding mad cow
disease in blood). Thus, neither the EU nor the US can claim to be categorically ‘more
precautionary’ than the other. The real pattern is complex and risk-specic. Third, the
paper seeks explanations for this complex pattern in ve sets of hypotheses: optimal
tailoring on the merits, political systems, risk perceptions, trade protectionism, and legal
systems. None of these hypotheses fully explains the observed complex pattern of relative transatlantic precaution. The paper concludes that differences in relative precaution
depend more on the context of the particular risk than on broad differences in national
regulatory regimes.
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1.

Introduction

The United States and the European Union have recently clashed over the regulation
of a number of health and environmental risks, from genetically engineered foods to
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climate change to beef. Pervading these specic controversies has been a larger debate
about the proper stance of government: how should regulators act in the face of uncertainty about risk?
Some advocate a ‘precautionary principle’ to justify and mobilize anticipatory
regulation of uncertain risks (Cameron and Abouchar, 1991). The notion of precautionary regulation is not new; prominent endorsements have appeared in both Europe
and the US since at least the 1970s (Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994; EEA, 2001; Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA, 1976; TVA v. Hill, 1978). But in recent years the ambition of precaution as an overarching ‘principle’ to govern all risk regulation has been growing. It is
paid homage in several important international agreements (Bodansky, 1991; Hey,
1992). The treaties that constitute the EU expressly provide that EU environmental
policy shall be ‘based on the precautionary principle’ (EU, 1997, article 174 [ex article
130r]). The European Commission has formally articulated and endorsed the precautionary principle (European Commission, 2000), and the European Environment
Agency has published a book on the advantages of precaution (EEA, 2001). Proponents
have forecast that it ‘could become the fundamental principle of environmental protection policy and law’ (Cameron and Abouchar, 1991, at 2). Some assert that the
precautionary principle may already be so widely adopted that it is ripening into an
enforceable norm of ‘customary international law’ from which no nation can dissent
(Sands, 1995; cf. Sand, 2000).
The United States, however, has not ofcially adopted the precautionary principle
as a general basis for all risk regulation. After endorsements of precautionary regulation in cases like Ethyl Corp. v. EPA (1976) and TVA v. Hill (1978), the US Supreme
Court held in the Benzene case (Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. API, 1980) that
OSHA cannot regulate on the basis of mere conjecture about uncertain risks; the court
ruled that the agency must demonstrate ‘signicant risk’ before regulating. This decision, and a 1983 guidebook from the National Academy of Sciences, spurred widespread
adoption of scientic risk assessment as the basis for American risk regulation over the
past two decades, while European regulation has remained more qualitative and
informal (Jasanoff, 1986; Jasanoff, 1998). The US insisted on qualifying the statement
of the precautionary principle in the 1992 Climate Change treaty (Bodansky, 1993 at
503–04), and the US responded to the European Commission’s recent endorsement of
the precautionary principle with a long list of skeptical questions.
Today, the conventional wisdom is that Europe endorses the precautionary principle
and seeks proactively to regulate risks, while the US opposes the precautionary
principle and waits more circumspectly for evidence of actual harm before regulating
(Daley, 2000a; McNeil, 2000; Richter, 2000; Levy and Newell, 2000; Kempton and Craig,
1993). In 1999 the Trade Commissioner of the European Union, Pascal Lamy, asserted
that ‘in the US they believe that if no risks have been proven about a product, it should
be allowed. In the EU it is believed something should not be authorized if there is a
chance of risk’ (quoted in Charnovitz, 2000, p. 295, n.181). As early as 1992, a senior
environmental ofcial of the European Commission said that the US ‘was denitely
leading European policy back in the 1970s and early 1980s’ but now ‘Europe has
certainly managed to catch up’ and on some issues ‘has taken over the role as world
leader’ (Henningsen, 1992, pp. 25–6). Fifteen years ago, comparisons of US and
European regulation found different procedural approaches but similar degrees of regulatory stringency (Brickman et al., 1986; Jasanoff, 1986; Vogel, 1985). Nowadays, leading
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scholars of comparative regulation are describing a ‘ip-op’: on this view, the US used
to be more precautionary than Europe in the 1970s, but Europe has become more
precautionary than the US since the 1990s (Cadot and Vogel, 2001; Lofstedt and Vogel,
2001; Lynch and Vogel, 2000; Vogel, 2001a, 2001b). Vogel writes:
From the 1960s through the mid 1980s, the regulation of health, safety and environmental
risks was generally stricter in the United States than Europe. Since the mid 1980s, the
obverse has often been the case (Vogel, 2001b, p. 1).

He emphasizes that these trends
have not produced policy convergence. On the contrary, European and American regulatory policies are now as divergent as they were three decades ago. What has changed is
the direction of this divergence. In a number of areas, Europe has become more riskaverse, America less so (Vogel, 2001b, p. 31).

Normative evaluations of this situation vary. Some observers see a civilized, careful
Europe confronting a risky, reckless and violent America (e.g., Richter, 2000). To this
group, the precautionary principle is an antidote to industrialization, globalization, and
Americanization. On the other hand, other observers see a statist, technophobic, protectionist Europe trying to rise to challenge a market-based, scientic, entrepreneurial
America (e.g., Redwood, 2001). To this group, the precautionary principle is an obstacle
to science, trade and progress.
In this paper, neither of these normative views is adopted. Instead, we critique the
factual premise on which both these views rest. We nd the conventional wisdom –
that Europe has now surpassed the US as the more precautionary regulator – to be
oversimplied and largely incorrect. The reality is much more complex; issue-specic
context is crucial. Sometimes Europe does take a more precautionary stance than the
US, but sometimes the US is the more precautionary regulator. This complex pattern
is occurring today and occurred in the past. One may nd a marked difference in relative precaution on particular risks taken one at a time (such as genetic engineering),
but a broader analysis of the evidence across the range of health and environmental
risks suggests that there has been no general ‘ip-op’ of relative precaution between
the US and EU. Ultimately, neither Europe nor America can claim to be the more
precautionary actor across the board. Thus, the notion of a great transatlantic struggle
over risk and precaution is misleading. And, we suggest, a debate over who is (or a
race to be) ‘more precautionary than thou’ is not the best way to improve regulatory
policy or transatlantic understanding.
In order to ground the comparisons of relative precaution across countries, section
2 presents a brief clarication of risk, uncertainty, and the precautionary principle. In
section 3, we present a range of risk regulation examples to illustrate the complex
pattern of variation in relative precaution between the US and Europe. We then focus
on the case of beef, including the use of hormones such as bovine somatatropin (BST)
and the spread of ‘mad cow disease’ (BSE), which have recently been the subjects of
conict between the US and the EU. Section 4 examines a set of hypotheses to try to
explain the complex observed pattern of relative precaution. Section 5 recommends
further comparative analysis of regulation, and a move from simple principles of precaution toward a more considered holistic concept of ‘prudent precaution.’
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Risk, uncertainty and precaution

All activities involve risk, by which we mean the combination of the likelihood (probability) and the harm (adverse outcome, e.g. mortality, morbidity, ecological damage,
or impaired quality of life) resulting from exposure to an activity (hazard). The manifestation of such harm may be prompt or latent.
Uncertainty can be distinguished from probability (Knight, 1933). Some risks (both
high and low probability) are well documented and understood, while others (both high
and low probability) are highly uncertain. For example, death by cellphone radiation
and lightning strikes may both be low probability, but the former may be far more
uncertain because we are unsure whether cellphones even cause brain tumors. Of course
all risks are uncertain to some extent, because we can never know the future with
complete certainty. Science is accustomed to this uncertainty. The public may sometimes assume that regulatory action can be based on ‘facts’ about what is ‘good’ or
‘safe’ and ‘bad’ or ‘unsafe,’ and may further assume that these facts are more or less
certain. Government sometimes gives credence to this myth, hiding behind claims of
scientic knowledge to justify policy decisions (Wagner, 1995). Not only is such belief
in the certainty of facts underlying regulatory decisions erroneous, but the failure to
recognize the underlying uncertainty is also dangerous: it invites demands for simple
choices and assured protections that cannot be satised (Rogers, 2001). The public’s
subsequent realization that the facts are disputed and the protections are imperfect can
give rise to public cynicism about government.
In the face of uncertainty about a risk, precautionary measures are often taken, such
as building bridges to hold excess weight, and setting radiation exposure limits conservatively. Yet it is never known for sure if these precautionary measures are effective
(since their success results in the absence of an adverse outcome that might not have
occurred anyway), or whether they are directed at the most important risks. Precaution
need not mean prohibition: we typically do not forego entire activities (such as eating
or transportation) simply because they might be risky; instead we fashion prudent
precautions that are proportionate to the expected risk.
In the face of probabilistic, uncertain and latent risks, government has two basic strategies: ex ante precautions, ex post remedies, or both. Ex post remedies include tort law
administered by the courts. Ex ante precautions include regulations administered by
agencies. Regulations are precautionary measures taken to avoid uncertain future harms.
Precaution can be considered a continuous variable: on the time path over which a
risk is forecast to become manifest, a regulation is more precautionary the earlier it
takes effect and the more stringently it restricts the suspected source of the risk. The
precautionary principle (PP) denotes part of the ex ante regulatory spectrum. But there
is no single accepted version of the PP. One author catalogues 19 different interpretations (Sandin, 1999). Here we distinguish three main versions of the PP:
Version 1: Uncertainty does not justify inaction. In its most basic form, the PP is a
principle that permits regulation in the absence of complete evidence about the
particular risk scenario. ‘[L]ack of full scientic certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation’ (Bergen
Declaration, 1990). But there is never ‘full scientic certainty’; decisions must
always be made under uncertainty. This version of the PP rebuts the contention
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that uncertainty precludes regulation, but does not answer the real question:
what action to take, given inevitable uncertainty.
Version 2: Uncertainty justies action. This version of the PP is more aggressive.
‘When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment,
precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established’ (Wingspread Statement 1998, in Raffensberger
and Ticknor, 1999, p. 353). But cause and effect is never ‘fully established.’ And
if it is unclear what causes the harm, it is unclear what ‘measures’ would prevent
it. Again, the real question is what action to take, given the uncertainty.
Version 3: Uncertainty requires shifting the burden and standard of proof. This
version of the PP is the most aggressive. It holds that uncertain risk requires
forbidding the potentially risky activity until the proponent of the activity demonstrates that it poses no (or acceptable) risk. For example,
the applicant or proponent of an activity or process or chemical needs to demonstrate that the environment and public health will be safe. The proof must shift to
the party or entity that will benet from the activity and that is most likely to have
the information (Raffensberger and Ticknor, 1999, pp. 345–6).

This shift in the burden of proof may elicit information from the least-cost
provider, but if the standard of proof is too demanding it may amount to overregulation.
2.1. CONFLICTING ERRORS

All of these versions of the PP, and indeed all choices between ex ante and ex post
legal systems, confront the tradeoff between two kinds of errors: false negatives and
false positives. False negatives occur when an initial nding of no (or acceptable) harm
later turns out to have been incorrect. False negatives are risked by presuming ‘innocent until proven guilty.’ Insufcient ex ante regulation can incur the harms of neglecting
false negatives: health and environmental damage (p. 1978). By contrast, false positives
occur when an initial nding of (unacceptable) harm later turns out to have been incorrect. False positives are risked by presuming ‘guilty until proven innocent.’ Hence,
adopting precautionary regulations can incur the cost of false positives: nancial losses,
restricted freedoms, and the foregone health and environmental benets of restricted
technologies. Every regulatory choice involves uncertain future risks and hence a
tradeoff between the risks of false negatives and false positives.
2.2. COUNTERVAILING RISKS

Page (1978) argued that regulation should err on the side of precaution, on the ground
that the cost of neglecting false negatives is harm to health and environment while the
cost of regulating false positives is just money. (Cf. Geistfeld, 2001.) But this analysis
is incomplete, because any precautionary intervention can also yield unintended side
effects – adverse effects on health and environment. Risk regulation, like medical care,
can both heal and hurt (Wiener, 1998). Reducing a ‘target risk’ can increase a ‘countervailing risk’; examples are ubiquitous (Graham and Wiener, 1995). Like Odysseus
navigating between Scylla and Charybdis, the modern regulator must weigh competing
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risks. Meanwhile, reductions in a target risk might also reduce ancillary risks; the goal
is to treat the ‘whole patient’ (Graham and Wiener 1995, pp. 226–71). Hence an uncertain risk does not automatically imply the need for ‘action’; the question is what action
to take, in a world of multiple uncertain and interconnected risks. Indeed, given
countervailing risks, version 3 of the PP could swallow itself: the proponent of a precautionary regulation – which is a human ‘activity’ – would have to demonstrate that the
precautionary regulation itself would be ‘safe’ before it could be adopted (cf. Cross,
1996). The solution to this paradox is to step out of the single-risk mindset and see the
real world of multiple risks, in which the regulator must optimize tradeoffs across interconnected risks.
2.3.

RECONCILING PRECAUTION AND RISK-BASED REGULATION

The various and ill-dened notions of precaution need to be connected to, and rened
in light of, the better-dened concepts in risk analysis and decision science (Stone, 2000;
Stewart, 2002). One of the most nuanced and balanced versions of the PP is contained
in the Communication issued by the European Commission in February 2000 (European
Commission, 2000). The Commission’s approach starts from version 1 above (uncertainty does not justify inaction). It then adds numerous qualications, such as the
need for precautionary measures to be proportionate and attempt to maximize net
benets, in light of the costs and risks of the various alternatives (including the alternative of no action); and the need to undertake research to reduce uncertainties even
after precautionary measures have been introduced. Despite having several ambiguities and potential shortcomings, the Commission’s Communication is in many ways
similar to the US guidelines for regulation in Executive Order 12866 (which requires,
among other things, that regulations be based on sound science and maximize net
benets) (Clinton, 1993). Given the similarities between these two documents, one might
expect some greater convergence between the US and Europe on regulatory policy
in the future. In both cases, the documents provide a sensible framework for regulation, but the actual outcomes will depend on how that framework is interpreted and
implemented.

3.
3.1.

Transatlantic Comparisons
BROADENING THE ANALYSIS

As noted above, the conventional wisdom is that Europe is now more precautionary
than the US. This view has become commonplace, and is the premise for critiques ung
from both sides of the Atlantic. But this premise rests on selective attention to only a
few examples, such as genetically modied organisms (GMOs).
A broader analysis reveals that the reality is a complex pattern of relative precaution,
both historically and today. Europe appears to be more precautionary than the US about
such risks as GMOs, hormones in beef, toxic substances, phthalates, climate change, guns,
and antitrust/competition policy. The US appears to be more precautionary than Europe
about such risks as new drug approval, the ban on CFCs in aerosol spray cans and
the ban on supersonic transport to protect the stratospheric ozone layer, nuclear energy,
lead in gasoline, particulate air pollution, highway safety, teenage drinking, cigarette
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smoking, mad cow disease in blood donations, potentially violent youths, ‘right to
know’ information disclosure requirements, and missile defences.1
This broader analysis indicates that neither the US nor the EU is a more precautionary actor across the board, today or in the past. Relative precaution appears to
depend more on the particular risk than on the country or the era. This complexity is
compounded by the variation within each system: both the US and the EU are federations of subsidiary jurisdictions, with variety in regulatory approaches within each
system. Meanwhile, compared to most of the rest of the world, the US and the EU are
probably both at the highly precautionary end of the spectrum.
3.2. BEEFING ABOUT BEEF

One of the sharpest transatlantic conicts over relative precaution has been about beef.
Here, we explore this example in some detail because it relates so closely to, and yet
helps refute, the conventional wisdom of greater European precaution. Recent headlines might suggest that Europe is more precautionary about beef than is the US. But
the reality is that Europe has been more precautionary about hormones in beef, while
the US has been more precautionary about mad cow disease (BSE) in beef and blood
donations. The beef cases are telling because they illustrate the considerable variation
in relative transatlantic precaution even within one eld of regulation involving the
same regulatory agencies.
3.2.1.

Hormones

a. BST in dairy production. Bovine Somatatropin (BST) is a naturally occurring
hormone that controls lactation in cows. It is now commercially produced as an agricultural pharmaceutical, synthesized by bacteria that have had a bovine gene implanted;
this form of BST is called rBST. When BST is injected into cows, their milk production can increase substantially. The US FDA approved the use of rBST in November
1993, stating that milk produced from cows that had been given the articial hormone
was indistinguishable from other milk. It is now widely used on US farms. But it is
banned in Europe.
The opposition to rBST in Europe was concerned with several impacts: animal welfare
(in particular, an increased incidence of mastitis among cows given BST), human health
(because farmers may use more antibiotics to counter the mastitis, and these could stay
in the milk as well as eventually reduce the effectiveness of antibiotics against bacteria
that infect humans), and socioeconomic effects (the potential harm to small farms unable
to compete against the economies of scale offered by new technologies). So far, the
available scientic evidence does not support the human health fears. Dr. Bangemann
(the then EC Commissioner responsible for Industrial Affairs, Information and
Telecommunication Technologies) stated:
It is clear that neither from an ethics nor a health viewpoint, is there any argument against
BST. The only decision that stands is one based on a political environment with its roots
in agricultural beliefs and traditions (Bangemann, 1993).

It must be stressed that although this statement was very robust, the formal European
position at that time was that rBST was banned as a precautionary measure by the
1

For a more complete analysis of these examples, see Wiener and Rogers (forthcoming).
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European Council Decision of 25 April 1990 (European Council, 1990). By this
Decision, Europe prohibited the administration of rBST in any form to dairy cattle
(Article 1) for a period of 10 years (up to 31 December 1999), except for the purposes
of carrying out scientic and technical trials (Article 2). There were two main reasons
for this prohibition. The rst was that the various effects of substances like BST were
not sufciently clear and that a period of time should be provided for in-depth studies;
this reason was precautionary in nature. The second reason concerned the internal
market and the need to avoid market distortions if different member states took
different decisions concerning the use of BST. The EC’s Committee of Veterinary
Medicinal Products had already found that BST was not a concern to humans. ‘Rather,
the proposal was based on the fear of Community ofcials that BST’s introduction
would undermine the competitive position of small-volume dairy farmers and thus
hasten the long-term consolidation of the dairy farm sector’ (Vogel, 1995, p. 172;
see also Vogel, 1997, pp. 24–5). In addition, the EC had experienced an oversupply
of dairy products, which had necessitated government subsidies of dairy farms as
dairy prices fell. These subsidies were being slowly decreased in the 1980s. Introduction
of BST might have exacerbated the dairy oversupply and thereby required more
subsidies in the future (Vogel, 1995). Still, the human health concerns seem to have
played some role, if only ancillary; although the PP was not expressly invoked, there
were plausible risk scenarios both in terms of animal and human health, but insufcient information, and thus the ban was limited to the time required to obtain further
information.
At the end of 1999 the European Council made this prohibition permanent and
removed the exception that had been available previously for scientic and technical
trials (European Council, 1999). This Decision was based on research that had demonstrated that BST increased the risk of mastitis and increased the duration of necessary
treatment for the afiction. Furthermore, there were increases in foot and leg disorders in dairy cattle when BST was administered, together with severe reactions at the
BST injection site. Thus for animal welfare reasons, which were required under The
European Convention for the Protection of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes, the
prohibition was made permanent. Precautionary action under scientic and technical
uncertainty (the time-limited prohibition of 1990) had been replaced by a risk management decision based on new knowledge. (The question of possible human health effects
was not addressed in these formal decisions.)
By contrast, the US permits the use of rBST. The US FDA began reviewing the use
of BST as early as 1989 (US FDA, 1989). The FDA approved the rst and only bovine
growth hormone used in the US, Monsanto Company’s Posilac®, on 5 November 1993,
but controversy regarding rBST safety in the human food supply persists. In April 1998,
the Canadian government issued a report that questioned the safety of rBST for humans
based on results from a 90-day oral toxicity study conducted on rats which tested the
effect of the hormone on antibody responses. This test was conducted for European
Union approval of rBST, and the US FDA did not review it during the original approval
process for Posilac®. The Canadian study also found signicantly higher levels of
insulin-like growth factor I (IGF-I) in milk, thus raising concerns for human safety. The
FDA then initiated a review of rBST, and in February 1999 issued its report reviewing
the current state of the science and concluding that the use of rBST is safe for humans
(US FDA, 1999a).
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The European Commission Directorate General XXIV issued a ‘Report on Public
Health Aspects of the Use of Bovine Somatotropin – 15–16 March 1999’ which questioned the safety of IGF-I in milk as a result of the use of rBST (see US FDA, 1999b).
The FDA then reviewed the available scientic data on the effect of rBST on IGF-I
in the spring of 1999 and reconrmed that ‘. . . the administration of rBST to dairy
cows is safe for all consumers, including infants. Additional exposure data are not necessary’ (US FDA, 1999b). The FDA also cited two ndings of the Joint Food and
Agricultural Organization/World Health Organization Expert Committee on Food
Additives (JECFA) which found in 1992 and again in 1998 that ‘. . . [studies have shown
that there is] an extremely large margin of safety for humans consuming products from
rBST-treated cows’ (US FDA, 1999b).
As to rBST, the European approach was more precautionary than the US approach.
This nding is consistent with the conventional wisdom that Europe is more precautionary than the US, particularly regarding products of genetic engineering but also
about new technological risks in general.
b. Growth hormones in beef production. Other hormones, both natural and synthetic,
have been used for some time as growth promoters in beef cattle. The use of such growth
promoters has been the subject of a great deal of controversy in Europe and has for some
time been totally banned in meat production. Since growth promotors are widely used
in the US, Canada, and in several other states, the European ban has given rise to an
international trade dispute under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) auspices.
There are six hormones involved in the dispute. Three are naturally occurring: oestradiol-17ß, testosterone and progesterone. Oestradiol-17ß is a sex steroidal hormone with
oestrogenic action, i.e. it is responsible for female characteristics, while testosterone is
a sex steroidal hormone with androgenic action, i.e. it is responsible for male characteristics. Progesterone is a sex steroidal hormone with gestagenic action, i.e. it is
responsible for maintaining pregnancy. All three hormones are produced in animals
and humans and are produced throughout life. They are required for normal physiological functioning of the body and for maturation and of course their levels vary with
age, sex, tissue and species.
The other three hormones are articially produced: zeranol (which mimics the action
of oestradiol-17ß), trenbolone (which mimics the action of testosterone), and melengestrol acetate (or MGA, which mimics the action of progesterone). In the US, all six
hormones are approved for growth promotion purposes. All except MGA are formulated as pellets that are implanted in the ear of the animal; MGA is administered as a
feed additive.
These hormones are carcinogenic at high doses in animal experiments, and there are
clear indications that these effects occur in humans as well. The essential problem
concerns the extrapolation to low doses, particularly because oestradiol, testosterone
and progesterone already occur naturally in humans at levels that are arguably greater
than those delivered in the meat from treated animals.
European concerns about the use of hormones for growth promotion purposes date
from the 1970s. The illegal use of the hormone diethylstilbestrol (DES) in veal production had been implicated as a possible cause of hormonal irregularities observed in
European adolescents (Vogel, 1995, p. 154). This had a signicant negative impact on
the veal market and strong regulatory action was thought necessary to restore consumer
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condence and to ensure the proper functioning of the European Single Market
(i.e., to avoid market distortions that would arise if some member states imposed bans
and other member states did not). The rst Directive banning the use of hormones for
animal growth promotion purposes was adopted in 1981 (European Council, 1981).
DES, the hormone responsible for the initial European concern, was also banned
in the US (Vogel, 1995, p. 154). As a result of a July 1981 debate in the European
Parliament, the Council of Ministers sponsored a scientic inquiry into the use of ve
hormones; this investigation found that three posed no health risk and that there were
no data for two (trenbolone and zeranol, which studies in 1984 and 1985 found not to
pose signcant risk to consumers) (Vogel, 1995, pp. 154–5; Vogel, 1997, p. 15). The US
FDA permits use of all ve of these hormones (Vogel, 1995, p. 158).
In 1985 the Council of Ministers extended the 1981 Directive to cover these ve
hormones. The EC’s agricultural commissioner, Frans Andriessen, explained that
‘Scientic advice is important, but it is not decisive. In public opinion, this is a very
delicate issue that has to be dealt with in political terms’ (Vogel, 1997, p. 16). The EU
also placed a ban on importing beef that had been treated with these hormones as
early as 1985. Sir Roy Denman, the then EC Head of Delegation to the US, compared
the EC’s ban on hormone-treated beef products to US restrictions on the sale of unpasteurized cheese from Europe because of ‘health reasons,’ arguing that Europe had never
demanded a scientic inquiry for this restriction but rather ‘accepted that Americans
have expressed a democratic preference for hygiene over taste, however eccentric or
unnecessary’ (Vogel, 1997, p. 18). Europeans also pointed to their restraint in declining
to challenge the US ban on Alar despite its questionable scientic basis (Vogel, 1995,
p. 163). The EU re-adopted its ‘Hormone directive’ in 1988, effective January 1989.
In response, the US increased duties on selected European products, but these duties
were relaxed while negotiations on a settlement were undertaken. After entry into force
of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(the SPS Agreement) on 1 January 1995, the US and Canada initiated formal dispute
resolution procedures against the EU under the WTO (Charnovitz, 2000; Vogel, 1997,
pp. 19–21). The US claimed that the European ban adversely affected US exports of
meat and meat products, that the EU’s measures were not based on an assessment of
risk, and that US meat and animals were ‘like’ EU meat and animals. The US position was that the EU ban was
not based on scientic principles and therefore . . . violates the WTO Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures. The United Nations Codex
Alimentarius has recently conrmed the lack of a scientic basis for restricting the use of
these growth hormones (USTR, 1996).

The US maintained that these hormones pose no risk to human health, stating that
decades of worldwide scientic studies have shown that consumption of beef from animals
produced using the six approved growth promoting hormones – estradiol, melengestrol
acetate, progesterone, testosterone, trenbolone acetate, and zeranol – does not present a
risk to human health. US beef is safe (USTR, 1999).

Further, the US argued that the EU’s ofcial ‘Opinion’ regarding the safety of hormones
is not consistent with numerous scientic reviews conducted by reputable international
organizations . . . and represents a signicant departure from the conclusions reached by
all previous international review panels (USTR, 1999).
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The USTR also pointed out that ‘hormones occur naturally in many foods. Consumers
are exposed every day to foods with higher hormone levels than those found in any
beef from animals treated with hormones’; for example, ‘hormone levels in beef are
far less than those found in eggs,’ and ‘one bowl of split pea soup has more than nine
times as much naturally-occurring estrogen as a ve-ounce portion of meat from a steer
raised using hormones’ (USTR, 1999).
In August 1997, the WTO Dispute Panel found that the EU’s ban on US beef and beef
products violated the WTO regulations and resulted in an annual loss to the US of $116.8
million (World Trade Organization, 1997). This decision was upheld by the WTO
Appellate Body in January 1998 (World Trade Organization, 1998; for discussion see
Charnovitz, 2000). The nal outcome of this trade dispute is still awaited; the US and
Canada have imposed trade retaliation measures against Europe and the parties are
seeking to negotiate a resolution. The EU continues to defend its position that these
growth hormones may be harmful to humans (Charnovitz, 2000, p. 274; Faull, 2000), and
the US continues to argue that they are not (USTR, 1999).
Regarding beef hormones, as with BST for milk production, the European approach
was more precautionary than the US approach. Questions about Europe’s risk management procedures have been raised, but the fundamental issue concerns the extrapolation
to low doses, and this remains a major issue for toxicologists. It may not be possible
to resolve the low-dose issue to the satisfaction of both sides, and hence the importance of the arguments over the question of whether the US meat was ‘like’ the EU
meat. Nevertheless, research continues to deepen the scientic understanding of the
risks to human health associated with the use of growth promotion hormones. The
problem is at heart one of scientic uncertainty and the propriety of precautionary
action. Both the BST and beef hormones decisions were premised more or less on the
precautionary principle. Yet both examples also suggest that other motivations may
also have been at work, including domestic economic concerns.
3.2.2.

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) (‘mad cow disease’)

a. BSE in beef. The rst case of BSE (or ‘mad cow disease’) in the UK occurred in
1985, followed by rapidly increasing numbers of BSE-infected cattle across England
(over 2000 cases by 1988). The peak of the UK epidemic occurred in January 1993,
with 1000 new cases diagnosed per week. By 1997 there were fewer than 200 cases per
week (US FDA, 1997). Between 1985 and 1999, over 160 000 cattle died from BSE,
and many more were slaughtered before reaching age 5 (the mean incubation period
for BSE) (Anderson et al., 1996).
The outbreaks were widespread and almost simultaneous, and hence there seemed
to be only one common probable cause: food contamination. Protein of animal origin,
including discarded brain and spinal tissue from previously rendered cattle and sheep,
had increased from 1% to 12% of British cattle feed in the 1980s, in response to the
increasing price of imported soy and shmeal (Rhodes, 1997). Ironically, it appears to
have been the well-intentioned recycling of this otherwise discarded animal material
that unwittingly introduced contamination into the cattle feed. Simultaneous changes
in the permitted manufacturing methods of cattle feed containing animal protein (among
others, permission to use lower processing temperatures) meant that greater numbers
of cattle were consuming feed that may have contained the infectious agent of scrapie
(a spongiform encephalopathy disease of sheep).
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In 1987, scientists suggested that BSE might be linked to feed containing the scrapie
infectious agent, and in 1988 the UK adopted a ban on feeding protein derived from
ruminant animals to cattle, and a slaughter policy for infected cattle. In 1989, the UK
government set up a scientic panel to advise on the problem. The presumed infectious agent of BSE is the prion, an abnormal protein that somehow stimulates an array
of brain diseases including BSE, scrapie, chronic wasting disease, and kuru, and the
transmission of which is not prevented by digestion or high heat (Prusiner, 1997). Prions
seem to reside only in the brain and spinal cord.
In addition to the afiction of cattle with BSE, there was growing concern that human
consumption of BSE-infected cattle products might transmit prions that could then give
rise to a human spongiform encephalopathy disease called Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
(CJD). It is generally accepted that diseased animals should not enter the food chain.
However, for a long time the UK government insisted that there was no risk to humans
from BSE, although the government did inaugurate a monitoring programme for CJD
(see UK, 2000). Ruminants’ brain and spinal tissues were not banned from entering
the human food chain in the UK until late 1989. The ‘no-risk’ assumption was based
on partial scientic advice; scientists had always argued that a link between BSE and
CJD could not be ruled out. Still, the government had accepted the scrapie origin for
BSE. This was reassuring with regard to CJD because scrapie had been endemic in
British sheep for more than 200 years and had never been linked to CJD. On that
basis, BSE (thought to be coming from scrapie) was assumed not to cause CJD.
In the rst half of 1990, at least seven countries, including France, West Germany,
Italy and Russia, banned the import of British beef. In June 1990, the EU agreed to
tighten regulations to prevent the spread of BSE, and in response France, West
Germany and Italy agreed to lift their bans. In 1994, the EU decided to loosen its regulations on cattle born after 1 January 1992. On 6 February 1996, ve German regional
states banned the import of British beef.
On 20 March 1996, the UK Government reported the appearance of a new variant
form of CJD (‘vCJD’), aficting young people, and raised the possibility that this vCJD
may have come from BSE that spread to humans from eating beef (Goethals et al.,
1998). 2 In the next few days, Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal,
and Sweden adopted temporary bans on British beef (and in some cases on live cattle
and beef products as well). On 27 March 1996, one week after the UK report of vCJD
was issued, the European Commission banned all exports of beef, live cattle and beef
products from the UK in Decision 96/239 (European Commission, 1996).
The UK challenged the Commission Decision of 27 March 1996 (the export ban) in a
case before the European Court of Justice. The British argued that the measures that
had already been taken by the UK were adequate and thus, in effect, that the export ban
was disproportionate; and furthermore that the Commission had exceeded its powers.
(The UK’s additional measures included banning the sale for human consumption of
meat from bovine animals over 30 months old, and banning the use of mammalianderived meat meal and bone meal in feed for any farm animal. Animal slaughter
procedures were also made more stringent. The EU adopted a feed ban in 1994.)
The number of human vCJD victims remains small – approximately 100 cases between 1996 and 2000 (Lyall,
2000), compared to over 160 000 cattle – but the appearance of CJD in young people is very rare; the type of brain
damage was different from that of traditional CJD, suggesting that a new human disease might be arising associated with BSE in cattle; and the latency period for manifestation of CJD may be several years, suggesting that
additional human cases of vCJD may appear over time.
2
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The Commission defended on the ground that the precautionary principle (PP)
empowered the Commission to take the action that it had taken, and that the action
was proportional to the threat. On the rst question, the Court made it clear that regulatory bodies have the right to invoke the PP, which means, the Court said, that
where there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks to human health, the institutions may take protective measures without having to wait until the reality and seriousness
of those risks become fully apparent.

This statement is essentially version 1 of the PP as described above. (Like version 1,
it does not say much, because there is always ‘uncertainty . . . as to the extent of risks,’
and the reality of risks is never ‘fully apparent’; the Court’s statement does not address
the real question of what measures to take in light of the inevitable uncertainty.) On
the second question, the Court ruled that the export ban was not a disproportionate
action by the Commission and furthermore reminded the litigants that the measures
were temporary pending the results of further scientic studies and the analysis of the
signicance of new information on vCJD. The Court therefore dismissed the action
brought by the UK (UK v. CEC, 1998).
The stringent measures taken by the UK against BSE in the national herd were
successful in reducing the incidence of BSE, and within months of its imposition the
EU began to lift its ban. On 11 June 1996, the ban on gelatin and semen was lifted,
and on 22 June 1996 – only three months after the EU ban on British beef was imposed
– European leaders signed the Florence Agreement which outlined a progressive plan
to lift the ban. Under this agreement it was not until 10 June 1998 that the export ban
was lifted on the next category of beef product – deboned fresh British beef from BSEfree cattle aged between six months and 30 months and born after 1 August 1996. The
export ban was eventually fully lifted by the European Commission in Decision 98/692
of November 1998 (European Commission, 1998), which became effective on 1 August
1999. Under the UK’s Date Based Export Scheme (DBES), deboned beef and beef
products were subsequently exported from the UK.
However, within the EU, France and Germany maintained their import bans, contrary
to EU law. The German Federal Government lifted its ban on 17 March 2000. The
French government has not lifted its ban. Instead, it produced evidence from the French
Food Safety Agency in support of its ban. France noted the increasing sensitivity of
tests for prions, allowing the detection of infectivity in tissues where none had previously been found. France also cited a possible slowdown in the rate of decrease of BSE
cases in the UK. Other concerns related to the effectiveness of surveillance programs
and meat traceability. This evidence was considered by the European Commission’s
Scientic Steering Committee (SSC), which agreed unanimously that ‘there are currently
no grounds for revising the overall conclusions of the SSC Opinions directly related to
the rationale of the DBES’ and that ‘the measures taken by the UK make any risk to
human health from the UK DBES at least comparable to that in any other European
Member State’ (European Commission, 1999a).
Following this nding, the European Commission asked France to lift its ban, but
France refused. In January 2000, the Commission declined to seek an injunction against
France to lift its ban, noting that the European Court of Justice has historically been
reluctant to grant injunctions against measures to protect public health. Later in 2000,
the Commission decided to seek a court order to require France to adhere to Decision
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98/692 and lift its ban on British beef (European Commission, 1999b). On 13 December
2001, the ECJ ruled in the Commission’s favour and ordered France to lift its ban (CEC
v. French Republic, 2001).
The situation became more complicated in late 2000, when small but increasing
numbers of cases of BSE began to be detected in France and other countries in Europe.
A French farmer was arrested in November 2000 for trying to smuggle a diseased cow
to market, and the rst cases of BSE were detected in Germany and Spain. In response,
consumer demand for beef plummeted (Daley, 2000b), several other European countries instituted bans on the import of French beef, France undertook measures (as
Britain had earlier) to restrict the use of animal protein in all animal feed and to prevent
cattle over 30 months old from being marketed (Minder, 2000), and the EU decided
to apply these precautions throughout Europe (Daley, 2000c).
Recently, the British Government promised to pay ex post compensation to vCJD
victims and their families. Farmers had already been compensated by the government
for the loss of their cattle (Lyall, 2000). Meanwhile, the ofcial Philips Inquiry delivered a stinging criticism of the slow response of the UK government to acknowledge
and combat the risks of BSE and vCJD (UK, 2000; Lyall, 2000). A subsequent French
parliamentary inquiry also denounced the British and EU policies – and even France’s
own comparatively aggressive stance – as inadequately precautionary (Daley, 2001).
‘Beef on the Bone.’ If the British government was reluctant to apply the Precautionary
Principle in the early stages of the BSE epidemic (1988–1990), the eventual appearance
of cases of vCJD by 1996 resulted in an opposite regulatory tendency. This is most clearly
demonstrated by the UK’s ban on the sale of ‘beef on the bone’ from 1997 to 1999.
As part of the investigations of BSE infectivity by the UK Ministry of Agriculture
Fisheries and Food (MAFF), it was discovered that positive infectivity was present in
nerve tissue connected to the spinal column, namely the dorsal root ganglia (DRG).
This tissue was not removed with the spinal cord when the animal was slaughtered and
was not covered by the UK regulations specifying those tissues that were banned from
human consumption. The DRG were associated with the bones and hence there was a
potential risk in the consumption of such beef products as T-bone steaks and rib joints.
MAFF estimated that less than 1 gram of infected nerve tissue could induce BSE in
50% of an exposed population; that four cattle in 2 million might carry infected DRG
tissue; and that about 5% of the DRG tissue would remain in cuts of beef on the bone.
With these inputs, MAFF’s probabilistic risk assessment predicted that the total beef
consumption of the UK in 1997 would confer a risk equivalent to a 5% chance of one
additional case of vCJD in the entire country per year, or an individual risk of around
one in 1 billion per year (Comer, 1998). Of course there were large uncertainties in the
analysis, and the results were highly dependent on the assumptions made (many of them
tending to overstate the risk). This risk was much less than the chance of being struck by
lightning. Nonetheless, the UK Government opted for extreme precaution and banned
all sales of beef on the bone until the BSE epidemic had been brought under control.
By taking such a precautionary approach, the government presumably reduced
consumer intake of contaminated beef, although ironically the regulations appear to
have provoked some outbreaks of risky behaviour: in some sections of the population
there seems to have been a wilful desire to increase the consumption of beef on the
bone. ‘Prohibition’ dinners featuring beef on the bone were offered by one hotelier,
oxtails were more in demand than before, and butchers outed the law. Even Professor
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Durant (public understanding of science, Imperial College London) was moved to
pronounce the ban farcical (Irwin, 1997). Although the ban on the sale of beef on the
bone has now been lifted in the UK, it is still the case that only deboned beef can be
exported from the UK under European Commission Decision 98/692.
The US Response to BSE in Beef. By contrast to the meandering path of UK and
EU policy as to British beef, the United States acted early and resolutely to bar such
imports, even though no cases of BSE had been observed in the US. In 1988, the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) established a BSE Working Group to evaluate the scientic evidence available on BSE and suggest appropriate responses. On
21 July 1989, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of USDA implemented an import ban on all ruminants and certain cattle products from the UK. On
6 December 1991, APHIS further restricted the importation of ruminant meat, meat
products and byproducts from all countries with conrmed cases of BSE (USDA, 1991).
APHIS broadened the import ban on 12 December 1997 to include all European countries (USDA, 2000). The US ban on beef imports remains in effect.
In addition, because rendered animal products used in animal feed may be the
common source of infection of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), the
US FDA adopted a domestic ban prohibiting the feeding of ruminant and mink protein
to ruminant animals which became effective on 4 August 1997 (US FDA, 1998). This
prohibition became effective nine years after the UK prohibition on the use of
mammalian protein in the manufacture of feed for ruminants and three years after a
similar policy was adopted by the EU, but a voluntary moratorium on mammalian
protein in feed had been in effect in the US for most of that period.
The USDA decision to ban BSE-affected beef is avowedly precautionary:
The USDA policy has been to be proactive and preventative. APHIS has taken measures
in surveillance, prevention, education, and response. Import restrictions have been in
place since 1989, and active surveillance efforts began in 1990. The USDA continually
monitors and assesses all ongoing events and research ndings regarding spongiform
encephalopathies, as new information and knowledge may lead to revised conclusions and
prevention measures. APHIS has also created a Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy
(TSE) Working Group to analyse risks of BSE to the United States, disseminate accurate
information about the TSEs, and act as a reference source for responding to questions
about TSEs (USDA, 2000).
As of 12 December 1997, APHIS has prohibited the importation of live ruminants and
most ruminant products from all of Europe until a thorough assessment of the risks can
be made. (USDA, 2000).
This action was taken in the past year because the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg
have reported their rst cases of BSE in native-born cattle. There is evidence that European
countries may have had high BSE risk factors for several years and less-than-adequate
surveillance. Additionally, Belgium reported that a cow diagnosed with BSE was processed
into the animal food chain. This science-based decision was made to protect human and
animal health, to ensure the security of US export markets, and to shield the safety and
the integrity of our food supply (USDA, 2000).

Summary. While Britain observed thousands of cases of BSE in the 1980s, it continued
to export beef. The EU waited to adopt its ban on British beef until 1996, lifted that
ban in phases between 1996 and 1999, and then pressed France to lift her remaining
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ban. Meanwhile, with zero domestic cases of BSE, the US imposed its ban on British
beef in 1989, broadened it to cover several countries, and continues that ban in effect
today. As to imports of beef, the US acted more quickly in the face of uncertain risk,
while the UK and EU spent more time conducting detailed risk assessments and ultimately imposed only temporary restrictions. Meanwhile, both the US and UK banned
mammalian protein in the feed for ruminants, but here the US was slower to formalize
that ban: the UK banned feeding animal meal to cattle in 1988 while the US did not
do so until 1997.
b. BSE in blood donations. A further concern about BSE is that it might be transmitted not only by eating beef, but by transfusions of blood from people who had eaten
contaminated beef. It has long been known that spongiform encephalopathy diseases
could be transmitted through dura mater (brain covering) grafts, contaminated supplies
of human growth hormone, and cannibalism in which victims’ brain tissue is eaten (the
source of kuru). But the risk that TSE could be transmitted via ordinary blood transfusions from people who had eaten BSE-contaminated beef was a highly uncertain
conjecture. Nonetheless, acting on that concern, in August 1999 the US FDA instructed
blood banks (such as the American Red Cross) to reject blood from any donor who
had spent more than six months cumulative in the UK during the years 1980–1996 (the
period of the BSE epidemic) (US FDA, 1999c). In June 2001 the FDA proposed to go
further, rejecting any donor who had spent three months or more in the UK or ve
years or more anywhere in Europe since 1980 (Hernandez, 2001).
The FDA ofcially titled this regulation a ‘Precautionary Measure.’ It acted despite
recognizing that there have been no studies showing human blood transmission of CJD,
only conicting animal data, and no cases yet of vCJD in the US; that the ‘transmissibility of vCJD by blood or blood products is unknown’ and the ‘transmissibility [of
vCJD] cannot condently be predicted from studies of CJD’; and that ‘No transmission of CJD or vCJD by human blood components or plasma derivatives has been
documented to date’ (US FDA, 1999c). European ofcials considered the risk ‘theoretical’ and ‘very small’ at the most (Tagliabue, 2001). But FDA said that
Until more is known about the possibility of vCJD transmission by blood components or
plasma derivatives, a precautionary policy of withdrawal for all of these products is recommended for material from donors with vCJD (US FDA, 1999c).

FDA banned blood from all donors who had spent at least six (later, three) months in
the UK, not just from those who had eaten British beef; and FDA added no question
to be asked of donors about their beef intake.
The boldness of this precautionary move is evident from the countervailing risk it
creates: a shortage of blood for use in hospital operating rooms. The American blood
supply is already very tight. The Red Cross testied to the FDA that the 1999 policy
would likely reduce the pool of eligible blood donors by about 2% (US FDA, 1999d),
and the 2001 policy would reduce the blood supply by 5–8% (Tagliabue, 2001). Blood
shortages would be severe in New York City: in addition to losing 8% of its American
donors, New York would lose the 25% of its blood supply that is imported from
European donors who would be banned under the 2001 policy (Tagliabue, 2001). These
reductions in blood supply pose a high and fairly certain risk of death to those who
need emergency blood during operations – in New York, a ‘disastrous . . . public health
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crisis’ (Tagliabue, 2001). And the restrictions increase the risk of other contaminants
affecting the blood supply (such as hepatitis and other blood-borne illnesses), because
collection organizations will have to replace oft-tested repeat donors with new donors
who may harbour risk factors that the screening tests do not always detect (i.e., false
negatives).
The FDA policy may have been motivated by recent concern about AIDS in the US
and French blood supplies in the 1980s. French ofcials were eventually convicted
of crimes for inadequately screening HIV-contaminated blood. In a combination of
the ‘availability’ heuristic (overstatement of the risk of similar recent incidents) and the
regulator’s reputational incentive to avoid false negatives, this recent history may have
encouraged FDA to be especially precautionary about the next disease to threaten the
blood supply, even remotely (cf. Sunstein and Kuran 1999).
Canada adopted a ban on blood donors who had spent six months or more in the
UK during 1980–1996 (Stecklow, 1999). This ban was expected to exclude 3–4% of
donors; one employee of the Canadian Blood Supply predicted a 10–15% decline in
blood supply (Toronto Sun, 1999), presumably because the Canadian donors who visit
the UK are especially signicant donors. In August 2000, Canada extended the blood
ban to include people who have spent six months or more in France (Blancheld, 2000).
By contrast, on 23 February 2000, France announced that it would not ban blood
donations from those who had travelled to Britain during the mad cow crisis, citing a
shortage of blood supplies (Bilefsky, 2000). This is especially noteworthy because it was
France that had suffered the most dramatic cases of HIV contamination in the blood
supply.
If the UK were to be as precautionary as the US and Canada, it would at least have
to ban all blood donations by its own citizens (as well as by those foreigners who had
visited the UK for over six months during 1980–1996). The impact on the blood supply
in the UK would be severe. Of course, the UK did not do this. In July 1998, Britain
began to implement a programme to purify its blood supply by ‘leukodepletion’ –
removing white blood cells from donated blood as a protective measure against vCJD
(Reaney, 1998a). In addition, beginning in February of 1998, government funded health
services were authorized to import blood plasma (Reaney, 1998b).
Recent research suggests that it might be possible for BSE to be passed on by blood
transfusions (Bostock, 2000). Scientists infected sheep with BSE and, before encephalopathy symptoms appeared, took blood from the infected animals and transfused it into
healthy sheep. The preliminary research results indicated that one of the transfused
sheep has begun to exhibit signs of BSE. The research programme will not be complete
for several more years. These preliminary results were followed by three related stories.
The rst reported that seven people who had subsequently developed vCJD had
donated blood, and that some of the blood from these donors had been mixed with
the blood of other donors before distribution to hospitals (Leake, 2000). (These donations occurred before the beginning of leukodepletion procedures in 1998.) The second
story concerned vertical transmission in humans (Rumbelow, 2000). A baby whose
mother died of vCJD seems to be showing symptoms of the same disease. Diagnosis
of vCJD can only be certain after death, but since vertical transmission of BSE occurs
in cattle, it does not seem unlikely that vertical transmission will eventually be found
in humans, and this may well be the rst case. Third, prion research has indicated that
it is possible for prion replication to occur in laboratory animals without those animals
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manifesting disease symptoms (Hill et al., 2000). This opens the possibility of asymptomatic carriers of TSEs, and hence the risk of transmission from apparently healthy
donors – and of course amplies the risks of exposure to BSE through ingestion of
food products from apparently healthy animals. Additional research suggests that prions
might be transmitted – and also detected – in dried urine (Blakeslee, 2001).
Taken together, the supporting evidence for the blood safety precautions taken by
the US, Canada and recently New Zealand is increasing. By any estimate the risk of
blood-borne BSE is very low, but one could not say that it is zero. The US and Canada
appear to be taking a much more precautionary approach toward BSE and vCJD in
the blood supply than are the UK or France. The reluctance of France and the UK to
restrict the blood supply derives precisely from concern about the countervailing health
risks of doing so. Even in the US, the FDA initially chose the ‘six months in Britain’
criterion, rather than a shorter time period or a criterion of ‘ate British beef,’ because
the FDA feared exacerbating the blood shortage by turning away too many donors.
Yet there is little evidence that any of these governments has carefully analyzed and
weighed the conicting risks of BSE and vCJD versus the risks of worsened blood
shortages.

4.

Explaining the complex pattern

The above analysis indicates that the conventional wisdom of a precautionary Europe
and a risky America (or a general ‘ip-op’ in relative precaution across the Atlantic)
is unpersuasive. The claim that Europe is now generally more precautionary than the
US, or even trending in that direction, appears to rest on selective emphasis of particular examples, such as hormones in beef and genetically modied foods. This claim
does not match up well against a larger sample of regulatory laws. Even in the area of
food safety, which is often cited as a agship of European precaution, the US has been
more precautionary than Europe on important recent examples such as mad cow disease
(BSE) in beef and especially in blood. More generally, neither the EU nor the US has
been consistently more adherent to the precautionary principle, whether viewed over
the last ve years or the last 30 years. The reality is a complex and mixed pattern over
both space and time. Relative precaution seems to depend at least as much on the risk
as on the country or the time period.
What accounts for the complex reality that the more precautionary actor is sometimes the EU, and sometimes the US? Many theories have been offered to explain
regulatory policies within one country, among them public interest theory, public
choice theory, civic republican theory, and the application of cognitive psychology
theories (Schroeder, 1998; Sunstein and Kuran, 1999). No one of these provides a
complete account of risk regulation in the United States (Wiener, 1999). Trying to
compare several regulatory decisions across two different polities magnies the weakness of single theories, especially when each polity is highly variegated and substructured internally as well. Moreover, the outcome we are observing and attempting
to explain – regulatory lawmaking – is highly sensitive to unobserved political contingencies and coincidences. Thus, no single ‘thick’ theory is likely to explain fully the
complex international pattern in relative precaution. Perhaps no coherent explanation
can be given. So many different variables are at play, so many different risks are being
addressed (by so many different institutions), and so many different societies are being

Comparing precaution in the US and Europe

335

studied, that a pluralist approach seems essential. Therefore, we do not propose a single
magic answer. Instead, we examine an array of potential explanatory hypotheses and
we offer some evaluations of each. We nd that none of the hypotheses fully accounts
for the complex pattern, but several in concert may be illuminating.
4.1. TAILORING ON THE MERITS

One possible explanation, in the vein of the public interest theory of regulation, is that
each society has made a different but reasoned judgment about the merits of precaution as to each risk. There can be good reasons to be precautionary, including the risk
of false negatives, the risk of low probability but high impact events, the problem of
long latency, and the lack of a contingency regime in case an adverse event does occur.
On the other hand, there can be good reasons to be circumspect about precaution,
including the risk of false positives, cost, the value of obtaining additional information
(versus the cost of delay), risk-risk tradeoffs, restrictions on individual freedom, and
the availability of ex post legal regimes (such as monitoring of products on the market,
and tort law to deal with the residual injuries that arise even after ex ante regulation
is imposed). Perhaps the US and EU have each evaluated this set of factors and come
to a judgment about how to tailor regulatory law to achieve the optimal balance in
each case. The optimal result on each side of the Atlantic may be different because of
different social, economic, and cultural factors. For example, European populations may
be more susceptible to some risks and American populations more susceptible to others.
Or the different populations may place different valuations on avoiding different risks
and these different valuations may change over time. Clearly, the costs of avoiding
different risks may vary (e.g. perhaps the EU was slow to regulate BSE in beef and in
blood because the costs of such regulations would be high there, whereas it was easier
for the US to take those actions). Or the ex post regimes for monitoring and sanctioning residual risks may vary.
All this may be so, but it is difcult to discern such tailoring from the regulatory
results. Neither the US nor the EU has taken a consistent position about its own stance.
Each has been sometimes precautionary, sometimes not. Worse, each has engaged in
the other’s ostensibly favoured approach even when the merits seemed to point the
other way: examples include potentially excessive US precaution on BSE in blood, and
apparently inadequate European precaution on BSE in beef. Yet neither side has
offered the kind of case-specic analysis of risks, susceptibility, side effects, valuations,
and costs that would persuade observers of the merits of each decision.
Perhaps the inconsistency reects the disaggregated nature of government. There may
be no one US or EU position on precaution because different agencies are making
different judgments in different cases. Each agency acts under its own statute (or several
statutes), and each member state of the US and EU has considerable regulatory
autonomy. Still, on particular issues such as beef, there are seemingly opposite responses
by counterpart agencies on closely related questions.
More generally, the pattern may be complex because rational judgment under uncertainty is always difcult. Achieving a consensus within a country is difcult and may
involve reliance not so much on rationality as on ‘rationalistic illusions’ (Funtowicz and
Ravetz, 1990). A fortiori, we should not be surprised by the difculty in obtaining
consensus across different countries and at different times.

336
4.2.

Wiener and Rogers
POLITICAL ADVOCACY

Some assert that the alleged ‘ip-op’ in relative precaution derives from cyclical political changes (Lofstedt and Vogel, 2001). The allegedly greater precaution in the US in
the 1970s and 1980s was attributed in part to the greater openness of the US legal
system to inuence by environmental advocacy groups, through political lobbying,
sunshine laws such as FOIA and FACA, notice and comment rulemaking, litigation to
challenge agency actions, citizen suits, and other avenues (Lynch and Vogel, 2000). The
argument that the EU has become more precautionary than the US since the 1980s is
now attributed in part to the efforts of Ronald Reagan and Newt Gingrich to hold back
US environmental activism while European environmental groups and Green Parties
were gaining strength (Lynch and Vogel, 2000; Vogel, 2001b). (Meanwhile, perhaps the
relative absence of formal avenues of inuence encouraged European advocacy groups
to turn to mass public responses, while the formal openness of the US system invited
American advocacy groups to become more litigious and less populist – to work within
the system rather than against it.) It is not clear, however, why there should be
such cycles in regulatory activity. Important environmental initiatives such as the 1990
Clean Air Act and the entire Clinton–Gore administration are elided. Larger inuences
on political demand for environmental protection, such as rising incomes, are not
addressed. Nor is it clear why, if there are such political cycles, the US and EU should
be travelling on alternating waves instead of in tandem or on converging paths.
Most theories of the effects of environmental advocacy groups on regulation suggest
that increasingly transnational networks act to mobilize simultaneous or converging
policy changes (Robinson, 1997; Slaughter, 2000), not alternating cycles. Similarly, the
theory of ‘legal borrowing’ suggests that countries often imitate each other’s legal
rules (Watson, 1993), and there is evidence of such under way in regulatory law between
the US and the EU (Bignami, 1999). Some of the writing by adherents of the ip-op
hypothesis has begun to speak instead about ‘convergence’ toward a common degree
of precaution (e.g. Cadot and Vogel, 2001). Notions of ‘regulatory cycles’ or a political ip-op may be more a heuristic than a robust explanation of reality.
Moreover, the political situation of advocacy groups does not seem sufciently broad
or deep to justify the ip-op hypothesis. Why, for example, were US environmental
groups impeded by the Reagan administration, but European environmental groups not
impeded by the Thatcher and Kohl administrations? Why were US environmental laws
so prolic and robust in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the US environmental
advocacy groups were edgling at best?
The different political systems of the US and Europe may help explain the opportunity, if not the root cause, for the rise of a more precautionary perspective in Europe.
European electoral systems are more open to small parties because they employ proportional representation; in the US, winner-take-all elections inhibit third parties. Thus the
Green parties in Europe have gained seats in parliaments (including the European
Parliament) and sometimes have been partners in governing coalitions (including in
Germany, France and Belgium) (Lynch and Vogel, 2000). By contrast, third parties
in the US (such as the Green and Reform parties) hold no seats in the Congress and
may never win the Presidency. On this view, the voting systems in Europe have over
time opened the door to greater voice for precautionary politics than would occur in
the US.
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On the other hand, it is also argued that regulatory policies in Europe tend to be
made more by political elites, whereas these policies tend to be more driven by mass
public attitudes in the US (Lofstedt and Vogel, 2001). On this view, it is the attitude
of these elites that explains both the European afnity for stringent environmental
precaution and the European aversion to stringent criminal punishments. In the US,
on this view, perhaps the public’s demands are reected in initially stringent but now
ebbing environmental regulations, and in increasingly stringent criminal laws. These
conjectures, of course, are immediately open to question. One wonders exactly who
these ‘elites’ are in Europe (and who ‘the public’ is in the US) and why they want what
they want. And the more populist system asserted to characterize the US is just as
often thought to give rise to more stringent environmental regulations than an eliterun system, not less (Breyer, 1993; Shrader-Frechette, 1991).
In any case, the ip-op image would predict greater precaution by the EU than by
the US in the 1990s, and yet this is not the pattern observed. The real examples of relative
precaution do not seem to t the political shift hypothesis. Large shifts in environmental
group or green party power, even if true, seem too broad to explain the complex mix of
regulatory approaches over time. True, the US enacted much important environmental
legislation in the 1970s, but several of these statutes operate on benet-cost principles
(e.g. the Toxic Substances Control Act and the Consumer Product Safety Act). Meanwhile
it was in the 1970s that Europe was explicitly adopting the precautionary principle
(Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994). True, US environmental law did face challenges from the
Reagan administration (though the sharpest challenges were limited to 1980–1982), but
the US nonetheless enacted highly precautionary statutes during the 1980s and early
1990s, such as the Superfund amendments of 1986, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, and the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (and the lead phasedown and CFC phaseout were
also accomplished during those years). The innovations introduced in US environmental
law in the 1990s, such as the use of the cap-and-trade system in the 1990 Clean Air Act
to control acid rain, the revision of the Delaney Clause in the Food Quality Protection
Act in 1996, and the revision of the Safe Drinking Water Act in 1996 (all by large bipartisan majorities), seem to reect learning rather than setback, and may well prove to be
more, not less, protective of the environment. Meanwhile, the US was more precautionary than Europe on several major topics during the 1980s and 1990s, including the phaseout of lead in gasoline and the BSE-motivated bans on beef and blood donations.
And although the EU has certainly accelerated its environmental regulatory activities
in the 1990s, and was more precautionary than the US on rBST and on genetically
modied foods, Europe has been less precautionary in recent years on such examples
as BSE-tainted blood donations. Thus, the examples arrayed over time do not seem to
bear out a generalized switch in the relative politics of transatlantic precaution.
4.3. RISK PERCEPTIONS

Perhaps specic regulatory responses are driven by public attitudes, and those public
attitudes about specic risks are different in the US and Europe. Perceptions of risk
may be inuenced by both cognitive errors and value choices. Among the sources of
public risk perceptions that may be relevant to the comparison of American and
European regulations are dread of the unfamiliar, the availability heuristic, distrust of
government, and culture.
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Familarity and dread

Risks seen as familiar, natural, and voluntary tend to be viewed as more acceptable
than risks seen as unfamiliar, unnatural or involuntary (Slovic, 1987). Perhaps the
European public now exhibits a greater ‘fear of the unknown’ than do Americans,
leading, for example, to more precautionary regulation in Europe of GMOs. Yet the
US has been more precautionary than Europe about other ‘unknowns,’ such as prions
in blood and nuclear power, while Europe has often regulated well-known risks such
as guns more stringently than has the US. Survey research suggests that the divergence
between US and European policies regarding nuclear power is not explained by differences in public fears, because Europeans and Americans are similarly fearful of nuclear
power (Karpowicz-Lazreg and Mullet, 1993; Slovic et al., 2000). Perhaps Europeans
resist GMO foods and rBST because these technologies are seen as unnatural. For
example, European consumers may be more closely attached to getting their food from
small local farms, while American consumers may be more comfortable with large hightechnology farming and mass-market distribution. The pattern of environmental
regulation over time and across countries might be explained in part by changing
conceptions of what is ‘natural’ and efforts to legislate protection of that ‘natural’ state
against the taint of ‘unnatural’ human disturbance (Wiener, 1995). What is deemed
‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ may differ between Europe and the US (as well as internally
within each).
4.3.2.

Availability

The ‘availability’ heuristic suggests that people will give greater weight to a risk which
is fresh in their minds, often because of a recently publicized incident (Sunstein and
Kuran, 1999). Put another way, an uncertain risk may seem more foreseeable to a party
who has had more recent experience with another similar risk, even if the two risks
are not causally related. Such awareness may also be heightened by news media attention. If the public responds particularly to recent incidents rather than to future
probabilities, then risk regulation may be buffeted by episodes of public clamoring
which are out of proportion to the expected social harm at issue, and which neglect
the risks of greater future importance. Perhaps people in European have responded
more intensely to hormones in beef, including rBST, because of the reported incidents
of illness among Italian children who consumed DES. And perhaps the European resistance to genetically engineered foods derives in part from recent concern about BSE
and other contaminants in food, even though the two may not be scientically
connected. Perhaps the aggressive US posture to BSE in blood donations relates to
publicity about HIV. But HIV in blood has been a major issue in Europe as well (particularly in France), yet European restrictions on BSE in blood have not been nearly as
aggressive as those in the US. Nor does the availability heuristic explain the relatively
sluggish UK response to BSE.
4.3.3

Distrust

Distrust of government can magnify public fears of a risk (Slovic et al., 1991). The
perceived mishandling of the BSE epidemic, as well as the scandal of AIDS in blood in
France and other events may have led the European public to distrust government assertions that rBST or genetically engineered foods represent low risks (Lofstedt and Vogel,
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2001). On the other hand, distrust does not seem to account for the stringent US stance
on BSE in beef and blood. And in general the US, more than Europe, is thought to have
a political culture that distrusts government (Nye et al., 1997).
4.3.4.

Cultural origins

One might try to nd deeper cultural underpinnings to the differences in risk perceptions between the US and Europe. Perhaps America has always attracted risk-takers
leaving Europe and elsewhere to seek opportunity, while Europe has retained a higher
proportion of people who are risk averse. This view may be consistent with the history
of immigration to the US from Europe, with the frontier ethic in America, and with
the apparently widespread view in Europe that America is uncivilized, violent and
commercially cutthroat (Daley, 2000a; McNeil, 2000). But this view is not consistent
with the observed evidence that on many risks the US has been more precautionary
than Europe (at least in the 1970s, if not more recently).
4.3.5.

Future research

Insights from cognitive psychology may be helpful here, but there are too few data to
make any real claims. There is a rich empirical literature on risk perceptions in the US,
and a growing literature on risk perceptions in Europe. There is a signicant need for
comparative risk perception studies, asking the same questions of respondents in both
the US and Europe. Some of that work is now being undertaken; it emphasizes differences between psychological and cultural approaches to comparing risk perceptions (e.g.
Renn and Rohrmann, 2000; Weber and Hsee, 2000).
4.4. PROTECTING DOMESTIC INTERESTS

Perhaps relative precaution in the US and Europe derives from factors other than a
desire to prevent health and environmental risk. Europeans may fear globalization,
especially if globalization means Americanization, and therefore may resist new products from the US. In particular, economic protectionism may explain some of the
complex pattern of relative precaution.
The EU may be seeking to protect agricultural trade, such as by excluding US beef
hormones, rBST and genetically engineered foods, but nonetheless allowing purchases
of British beef despite the residual risk of BSE. As noted earlier, some EU ofcials
were explicit that the bans on hormones and rBST were for economic reasons – to
protect the internal European market and to shield small farmers – and not for health
reasons. The WTO made a similar nding. Meanwhile, the US may be trying to foster
exports of its agribusiness products (including hormone-fed beef, rBST, and genetically
engineered foods), while excluding British beef.
Trade rivalry may also play a role in global environmental treaty negotiations.
The US apparently did weigh international competitiveness concerns in its deliberations over the Montreal Protocol: it decided to back the phaseout in part because US
producers saw a lead over foreign competitors in CFC-substitutes (Litn, 1994; Wiener,
1999). Europe may be making a similar calculation about seeking higher targets
for greenhouse gas emissions reductions: such targets, especially with curbs on the
global emissions trading sought by the US, may impose higher costs on the US and
Japan than on Europe (Wiener, 1999). And perhaps US restrictions on European blood
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donations might be explained as an effort by the Red Cross to exclude imports and
restrict supply so as to drive up the price that hospitals pay for blood (yet this hypothesis is weakened by the fact that the Red Cross has simultaneously been resisting FDA
efforts to tighten other safety rules). These may be examples of attempts at ‘predation
by regulation’ in which regulation is sought by one faction in an industry, not to protect
the environment, but to impose higher costs on competitors (Bartel and Thomas, 1987).
But the extrapolation of such motivations from industry lobbyists to national government decisionmakers is not always accurate.
Pending further empirical analysis, we are hesitant to explain relative precaution in
terms of international economic competition. There is little of an iterative strategic
game (such as tit-for-tat or a ‘race to the bottom’ or ‘race to the top’) between the US
and EU. Much of US and EU precautionary regulation seems largely inward-looking;
the international trade disputes that have arisen may only be occasional frictions at the
perimeter of a more important domestic policy debate. Many examples of relative
precaution seem unmotivated by trade rivalry, including measures regarding blood
donations, youth violence, gun control, highway speed limits, and the US ban on CFCs
in aerosol spray cans. To be sure, some precautionary restrictions can have major
impacts on international trade, but that does not mean that the trade implications are
motivating the regulatory restrictions.
4.5.

LEGAL SYSTEMS

Differences in the legal systems of the US and Europe may also play a role in
the different uses and meanings of the precautionary principle. As noted above, the
different electoral systems may play a role in enabling Green parties to inuence governance. Here ve additional aspects of the legal systems are suggested, recognizing that
neither European nor American legal systems are internally uniform.
First, relative advocacy of the precautionary principle may be inuenced by the relative credibility of national legal commitments. The openness of US law to citizen
advocacy groups, judicial review, and science-based adversarialism may make the US
more likely to enforce such precautionary measures as are adopted (Jasanoff, 1986;
Kagan, 2001; Rose-Ackerman, 1985). This feature of American law may help explain
the resistance of the US to adopting strong versions of the precautionary principle in
international treaty negotiations: precisely because the US legal system is more likely
to enforce treaty provisions on precaution – through citizen suits, judicial review, and
direct legislative and executive implementation (Glennon and Stewart, 1998) – the US
government may be more reluctant to agree to precaution in international fora. The
EU, having already adopted precaution in its own treaties, and knowing that its domestic
legal systems are less likely than US courts to enforce such language stringently (Sand,
2000), in part because of judicial moderation and in part because of the historically
lower prole of citizen advocacy groups and courts in European law, may be more
comfortable with signing on to strong precautionary language. This, in turn, magnies
the US anxiety that Europe will not actually do what the US has agreed to do, further
eroding the basis for adopting a common statement of the PP in an international agreement. Put another way, US and European negotiators may be reading the same
precautionary text in two very different ways: the US as enforceable law, and Europe
as more hortatory rhetoric. This difference in envisioned legal consequences, rather
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than a difference in aspirations for protection of public health and the environment,
may help explain the differences in willingness to espouse the precautionary principle.
Second, precaution and ex post remedies may be interrelated in different ways in the
US and Europe (and as to different risks). Better mutual understanding of each
country’s domestic legal systems might help bridge this gap. For example, ex ante precaution may be greater where ex post remedies against private rms are weaker. The
generally stronger US system of tort law may make ex ante precaution a less urgent
social device in the US than in Europe, where ex post remedies tend to be weaker.
Thus US reluctance to agree to stringent versions of precaution may reect condence
in the US legal system taken as a whole – not opposition to protecting health and the
environment. And European advocacy of stringent versions of precaution may reect
an implicit assumption that, in the absence of strong ex post tort liability, ex ante regulation is the only real bulwark between risks and the public – not advocacy of draconian
overregulation. (The exception of more precautionary US regulation regarding BSE in
blood may reect the unusual immunity from tort liability granted to blood banks in
almost all US states, whereas the ex post remedies for blood contamination may be
stronger in Europe.)
A twist on this tort-regulation interaction is that ex ante precaution may be greater
where ex post remedies against the regulator are stronger. Although the US may have
a more vigorous tort liability system overall, the US has a special doctrine immunizing
government policymaking from tort liability, which some European governments and
the EU institutions do not. Thus European regulators may seek to employ stringent ex
ante regulation in order to shield themselves from lawsuits that could be led against
them if they left small risks unregulated. The contamination of blood with AIDS in
France, and subsequent prosecution of French regulators, is a case in point – perhaps
acting as an ‘availability heuristic’ for regulators facing BSE. (But this theory fails
to explain the US FDA’s highly precautionary regulation of BSE in blood, because
under the US doctrine of sovereign immunity for discretionary policies the FDA probably could not be sued if it allowed BSE to contaminate blood in order to avoid blood
shortages.)
Third, the difference between the EU legislative system and the American separation of powers system may be important. The European Commission negotiates on
behalf of its member states, and ministers of the member states’ parliaments know that
they represent the party in power in their home legislatures. By contrast, US negotiators know that they may well face a hostile Congress at home, perhaps controlled by
the opposition party. Hence US negotiators may be more wary of bringing precautionary language back for ratication than are European negotiators.
A fourth point is that in Europe, the precautionary principle is understood in tandem
with the principle of proportionality (Jackson, 1999; Emiliou, 1996). The US has no
general principle of proportionality in regulatory law, though some are trying to nd
it in the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ test of the Administrative Procedure Act (and
‘proportionality’ does crop up in American law regarding state restrictions on interstate commerce, self-defense against violence, and other areas). Thus it may be that
the US worries that agreeing to the PP could mandate disproportionate, stringent and
hasty regulation, while Europe assumes that it can rely on proportionality to moderate
precaution. More generally, the US Constitution has few or no general ‘principles’ of
afrmative government responsibility to act. Instead it delegates enumerated powers to
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the federal government, and then recognizes individual rights against government action.
European law may be more comfortable than is American law with the notion of overarching afrmative principles, of which the precautionary principle is just one example.
Fifth, the debate over precaution may be serving a role in managing the internal
legal hierarchy of each system. The EU may be consolidating while the US is devolving.
The European Commission may be trying to use its interpretation of the precautionary
principle as a way to foster its legitimacy and/or the Single European Market. For
example, the dispute over BSE reects not just the initial EU and US trade sanctions
against Britain, but also the subsequent effort by the EU to insist that all member states
conform to the EU’s revised policy allowing trade in British beef, and more recently,
to impose consistent restrictions on animal feed in all member states. Hence the
European Commission’s ‘Communication’ on the precautionary principle (European
Commission, 2000) – which attempts to dene precaution with several moderating qualications – may have been directed as much toward winning the internal battles of risk
regulation within the EU, rather than the external battles with the US. By contrast,
the US may be resisting blanket principles such as the PP because it already has a
highly centralized regulatory system and is in a period of debating whether to afford
its member states more autonomy in setting regulatory standards.3 For this reason, the
US may approach precaution case by case rather than as a categorical principle.
These several legal differences between the US and Europe suggest some reasons
why the EU might publicly espouse the precautionary principle more eagerly than does
the US, even if US regulation is as or more precautionary than European regulation
in actual practice. This suggests one possible reason for the conventional wisdom on
relative precaution: confusing rhetoric with implementation. But the legal system differences do not correspond to a general switch in relative transatlantic precaution over
time. Nor do the legal system differences fully explain the complex pattern of relative
precaution with respect to specic risks in practice, such as rBST and BSE.

5.

Conclusions

The central conclusion of this article is that there is much variation and even inconsistency in the relative precaution exhibited by US and European regulatory policies
over time. There is no single or simple basis on which the relative precaution of the
US and Europe can be categorically compared. Contrary to the conventional wisdom
(based on a narrow sample), we nd that across a broader range of cases the EU is
not systematically more precautionary than the US. Nor have the US and EU ‘ipopped’ over time. Nor can we say that the EU has been more precautionary about,
say, food safety than the US; our detailed examination of the case of beef reveals
greater European precaution about hormones in beef but greater US precaution about
mad cow disease in beef and in blood. Each actor has been more precautionary than
the other as to some risks and less precautionary as to others. The degree of precaution exhibited appears to depend less on some overarching national regulatory posture,
and more on the context of the particular case: the risk, the technology, the location,
the era, the politics, the public, the agency, the legal system. Perhaps, given contingent
If in the future the US Supreme Court further restricts the national government’s power to regulate risks under
the afrmative commerce clause, then agreeing to precautionary standards for risk regulation in an international
treaty might become a more attractive avenue to the US Executive Branch.
3
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episodic politics sparked by availability heuristics, the pattern may even be random or
chaotic. Rather than attempting to characterize one country as ‘more precautionary’
than the other, and looking for systemic factors that distinguish all US regulation from
all European regulation, we should be investigating relative precaution as a function
of the contextual variables with respect to each risk. This research would develop a
better understanding of comparative public law, comparative regulatory systems,
comparative regulatory politics, and comparative risk perceptions, both across countries and across issue areas.
These observations suggest several lessons about the international debate over the
precautionary principle. First, there can be a signicant difference between rhetoric and
reality. The apparent divergence between the US and EU in advocacy of precaution
must be tempered by an understanding of the reality of application across
cases, and of the reality of the different legal, political, cultural and economic contexts
on each side of the Atlantic. The reality is complexity, not coherence. Moreover,
even as the US and Europe dispute who is more precautionary than the other, from a
global viewpoint both the US and Europe are probably at the highly precautionary end
of the spectrum compared to the rest of the world. The acrimony over precaution
between the US and Europe may be driven less by real differences over regulatory
philosophy than by a larger contest for great power leadership after the Cold War
(Daalder, 2001). Or it may merely reect the overstated distinctions and competitive
strategies between social groups that psychologists have frequently observed people
assert, even when people are sorted into groups at random (Horowitz, 2000, pp. 144–7;
Tajfel, 1970).
Second, the claim that the precautionary principle is ripening into a tenet of customary
international law needs qualication. Customary international law derives from state
practice, but here the record suggests inconsistent state practice, both across countries
and within advocate countries. Not only have the US and Europe adopted varying positions as to different risks, as shown here, but some countries have simultaneously
championed the precautionary principle regarding risks they face from neighbours while
rejecting the precautionary principle regarding risks they pose to others (Sand, 2000).
Third, the contest to crown the US or the EU as ‘more precautionary than thou’ is
not only factually misleading, it is also deleterious to sound regulatory policy. A ‘race
to precaution’ could be undesirable for both sides. To be sure, regulatory cooperation
on health and environmental risks may be desirable, in order to remove trade barriers,
avoid a ‘race to the bottom,’ and adopt better regulatory approaches built on experience with past regimes. The potential convergence of US principles of risk-based
regulation (e.g. Clinton, 1993) and the European Commission’s Communication on the
Precautionary Principle (European Commission, 2000) may offer hope in this regard.
On the other hand, some diversity in regulation can be healthy – it can respond better
to local benets and costs, and it can furnish a laboratory of experimentation that offers
insights for continuous improvement. We would not urge a race to harmonize ‘up’
toward adoption of the most aggressive versions of the precautionary principle, because
there are real hazards of excessive precaution: false positives, cost, innovation, and riskrisk tradeoffs. At the same time, we would not urge harmonization ‘down’ to the lowest
common denominator, because there are real hazards to reactive regulation: false negatives, delay, and hence unabated target risks. Instead of a race to be precautionary, or
a debate over national precaution across the board, governments should seek to design
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and apply constructive and contextual regulatory strategies. We should neither ignore
uncertain risks, nor overreact; but rather seek ‘risk-superior’ ways of reducing those
risks without worsening countervailing risks (Graham and Wiener, 1995). The goal
should be a form of ‘prudent precaution’ that addresses both the risks of inaction and
the risks of action.
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